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Abstract
Political scientists bring important tools to the analysis of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, 
particularly a focus on the crucial role of power in global health politics. We delineate different kinds of power at play 
during the COVID-19 crisis, showing how a dearth of compulsory, institutional, and epistemic power undermined 
global cooperation and fueled the pandemic, with its significant loss to human life and huge economic toll. Through 
the pandemic response, productive and structural power became apparent, as issue frames stressing security and 
then preserving livelihoods overwhelmed public health and human rights considerations. Structural power rooted in 
economic inequalities between and within countries conditioned responses and shaped vulnerabilities, as the crisis 
threatened to deepen power imbalances along multiple lines. Calls for global health security will surely take on a new 
urgency in the aftermath of the pandemic and the forms of power delineated here will shape their outcome.
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The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has wrought enormous loss of human life and depressed economic growth worldwide. The 
containment of the virus and treatment of its victims 
overshadows all other concerns as intensive care unit beds 
are requisitioned, personnel shifted, budgets repurposed, 
supplies redirected, and governments scramble to address the 
crisis. Political scientists bring important tools to the analysis 
of the pandemic, particularly a reflection on the crucial role 
and the various forms of power in health.1 The weakness 
of compulsory, institutional, and epistemic power sheds 
light on the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic, while 
the pandemic itself has laid bare the ways that productive 
and structural power not only affect responses but are also 
reproduced through the crisis.
Multiple, overlapping forms of power are evident in global 
health, a fact that shapes global health policy and advocacy.2 
Power can be coercive, as in ‘A has power over B to the 
extent that he can get B to do something that B would not 
otherwise do.’3 An overabundance of such compulsory power 
(often rooted in material resources) can skew global health 
priorities.4 Institutional power is embedded in informal and 
formal rules and decision-making bodies like the World 
Health Organization (WHO). Until its decline in the 1990s, 
the WHO’s power reflected its ability to coordinate the views 
of health experts, its representation from most countries 
in the world (all with equal voting rights), and its financial 
resources.5 The WHO has some epistemic power, or the ability 
to speak authoritatively because of its expertise; however, if we 
examine global health more broadly, the field lacks epistemic 
power because of its multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary 
nature. Despite how its ‘claims to knowledge’ may be portrayed 
as ‘objective truth’ rooted in ‘neutral’ evidence,6 global health 
lacks a common epistemology, sense of causal beliefs, and 
methodology.4 
Normative power is apparent when some have legitimacy 
and influence because they claim to speak for ethical 
principles, such as WHO’s advocacy for a ‘right to health for 
all.’ At the national level, this power is embodied in a social 
contract, whereby citizens consent to government engagement 
on population health. At the global level, no normative social 
contract exists, and the exercise of power can lack legitimacy 
because it does not rest on inclusive forms of consultation with 
the people it most affects.5,7 Structural power manifests itself in 
economic, social and/or political relationships that reinforce 
subjective interests, while productive power undergirds 
social processes that create meaning. The ‘unconscious and 
unacknowledged nature’ of these forms of power perpetuates 
health disparities,8 and it enables those who benefit from 
these forms of power to decide ‘what does and does not get 
taken seriously.’9
The emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrates 
the limited scope of compulsory and institutional power. Even 
though powerful countries (China, the United States) were 
affected first, they were unable to compel other countries to 
act to curtail the virus. For example, Italy could not make 
European Union countries share health supplies, and the 
United States could not force China to share data on early cases. 
Similarly, because the WHO has no enforcement mechanism 
to punish its members for health actions (or inactions) and 
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thus, must rely on diplomacy, it could not make countries 
avoid travel bans, share case counts, or do early testing. 
Similarly, the WHO’s institutional power was limited, despite 
the fact that the International Health Regulations obligate 
countries to notify the WHO about emergent health threats to 
facilitate a coordinated international response. With the force 
of international law, the International Health Regulations, 
modified after China delayed disclosure of the severe acute 
respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak in 2002-2003, cover 
novel infectious diseases and authorize the WHO to declare 
an international health emergency.10 However, because the 
WHO depends on countries to recognize and respond to its 
institutional power, it is at the mercy of political processes. 
Chronic budget shortfalls, the rise of other health-focused 
bodies like the Gates Foundation, financial dependence on 
wealthy countries, and what are often perceived to be non-
inclusive decision-making processes also undermine the 
WHO’s institutional and normative power.5 
Similarly, as Grépin might predict,4 global health’s challenge 
in fostering coherent, epistemic power meant that early, 
effective responses rooted in scientific and public health 
expertise lagged and infections soared. Public health experts 
struggled to assert the superiority of their tools for preventing, 
diagnosing, and treating COVID-19 against political leaders 
who questioned their authority and seemed to espouse 
a non-traditional source of epistemic power. Scientific 
studies of the virus’s genome and development of accurate 
diagnostic tests were pitted against populist disregard of the 
virus’s severity or blind faith in untested treatments. While 
most world leaders championed the scientific approach (eg, 
German chancellor Angela Merkel), others exhibited a dim 
view of traditional scientific epistemology. US President 
Trump effectively proposed dropping current guidelines for 
drug trials by demanding that hydroxychloroquine be tested 
on humans as a possible treatment for COVID-19. Similarly, 
presidents Jair Bolsonaro (Brazil), Daniel Ortega (Nicaragua), 
and Alexander Lukashenko (Belarus) downplayed the virus’s 
seriousness and resisted expert advice on social distancing, 
actions that facilitated viral spread.11
Productive power undergirds how policy-makers and 
publics framed the pandemic and then responded. As 
discursive tools, frames enable individuals to ‘simplify and 
make sense of the world around them,’12 and they ‘determine 
automatically and repetitiously’ subjective perceptions of 
reality.8 They can galvanize action, particularly when they 
manifest frame coherence, or consensus among experts 
about the problem and its solutions, and when that consensus 
resonates with the public and policy-makers.12 Initially, 
leaders framed COVID-19 as an existential threat to national 
security, with the response being a ‘war,’ the virus being an 
‘enemy,’ and healthcare workers termed ‘warriors.’ This frame 
mobilized publics for behaviors like social distancing. But 
it also enabled some governments to justify human rights 
abuses, and it contributed to panic-buying, stock sell-offs, 
risking healthcare workers’ lives without adequate protective 
equipment, and demonizing and scapegoating people believed 
to carry the virus like Asian-Americans.13 These processes 
deepened the productive power of racism and fear in making 
social meaning.
As the virus spread globally, an economic cost-benefit 
frame took hold. Lockdowns, market closures, and the 
resulting unemployment threatened livelihoods for millions, 
making the economic cost of curbing the virus seem too 
high. This frame resonated with policy-makers, and countries 
like Ghana, the United States, and Germany began to relax 
population movement restrictions, even though public 
health officials warned about a resurgence of cases. (This 
also showed the limits of epistemic power). A few leaders 
espoused a human rights frame that stressed the right to 
testing, ventilators, and dignified care, as well as solidarity 
to protect the most vulnerable people. This frame embodied 
a normative power that may check other forms of power 
that harm health.6 Yet without the backing of compulsory 
or institutional power from a powerful country, this frame 
did little more than motivate community action. Frame 
incoherence on COVID-19 made global collaboration 
difficult, a pattern evident on other issues like mental health 
and early childhood development.14
Both responses to COVID-19 and the pandemic’s economic 
impact elucidate structural power inequalities among 
diverse countries. As an example, countries with substantial 
industrial bases increased production of masks, respirators, 
and other medical supplies, although reliance on just-in-time 
global supply chains hampered re-tooling. Countries with 
little industrial capacity, in contrast, had less ability to protect 
and treat their citizens, and thus, had to depend on donor 
aid. Because many people in the global South depend on 
wages from unskilled labor, informal-sector work, or migrant 
remittances and lack access to savings and publicly funded 
social safety nets, the pandemic-induced economic recession 
may be more devastating to them than to populations in the 
global North. Hoarding and export restrictions have caused 
price surges for wheat and rice, two global food staples,15 
with probable knock-on effects of greater poverty-induced 
malnutrition, disease, and bodily insecurity. To address the 
pandemic’s economic fallout, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) committed to assisting countries with high 
debt burdens and providing poor countries with emergency 
reserves, a proposal the United States blocked in order to 
restrict benefits to Iran and Venezuela.16 Structural power 
imbalances were reproduced, as poor countries had to turn 
to the IMF, and the United States could capitalize on this 
dependence to pursue its geopolitical goals. Structural power 
intertwined with institutional power, as the United States used 
its IMF voting rights (determined by a country’s contribution 
size, which is based on its economy) to sway decisions.
Within countries, structural power rooted in the long-term 
accumulation of socioeconomic advantage and disadvantage 
along race, class, and other lines underlies the unequal impact 
of COVID-19 on people’s health, ability to protect themselves 
from infection, and economic wellbeing. For example, 
African Americans have suffered a disproportionate number 
of deaths, an outcome that has been linked to long-standing 
racial disparities in living environments and inadequate 
care for chronic diseases. Structural power overlaps with 
the productive power of racism, which fosters measurable 
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stress on bodies and undermines patient-physician trust.17 
In addition, structural power is apparent in that some 
individuals—healthcare workers, grocery store clerks, 
restaurant staff—must do their job in person, putting them 
both at risk of exposure and, for some, risk of unemployment 
in a lockdown. Increased unemployment deepens structural 
imbalances, as those with smaller savings and fewer assets 
struggle to ride out the economic downturn. Low-income 
people are disproportionately affected by school closings, 
which can depress learning (particularly with no online 
options), lower parents’ productivity, harm child nutrition 
(without school feedings), and increase the risk of violence 
toward children.18 Educational setbacks deepen power 
imbalances and economic inequities.
In conclusion, the weakness of compulsory, institutional, 
and epistemic power explains the failure of the WHO and 
individual countries to stop COVID-19, while productive 
and structural power undergird responses. The pandemic 
initially appears to have given proponents of isolationism 
and unilateralism the upper hand as they argue that the 
economic and human costs of COVID-19 prove global 
health governance’s failure. But because forms of power lie 
in tension,1,2 this is not the only alternative. Motivated by 
the pandemic’s high cost to global commerce and the loss 
of normative leadership in human development, powerful 
countries may exercise compulsory or institutional power 
to strengthen the WHO, improve international infectious 
disease surveillance, and assist poor countries in building 
stronger health systems. On-going research about the virus 
and the outcomes of public health measures could deepen the 
epistemic power of proponents of reducing health disparities 
and bolster global health cooperation. While all parties may 
emerge from the pandemic calling for improved health 
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